

## Message Text

SECRET

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73

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

/031 W

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P 112215Z OCT 74

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2238

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0104

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652 XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 11, 1974  
(SALT TWO - 464)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER  
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF OCTOBER 11, 1974. QUOTE:

YOUR STATEMENT WILL BE STUDIED CAREFULLY. EVEN NOW I  
HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY ON SOME OF THE ASPECTS WHICH WERE  
ADDRESSED JUST NOW, AMONG THEM ON QUESTIONS OF THE LOGIC  
OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE  
SIDES AND CONSEQUENTLY ON THE LOGIC OF THEIR LIMITATION,  
THE LOGIC OF CURBING THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS RACE.  
BUT WE WILL RETURN TO THIS MATTER AT ONE OF THE NEXT MEET-  
INGS.

I BELIEVE THAT YOU, MR. AMBASSADOR, AND THE MEMBERS OF  
THE U.S. DELEGATION UNDERSTAND WELL THAT THE PATHS OF THE  
DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE SIDES HAVE  
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BEEN DIFFERENT. I WOULD NOT SAY THAT ANYTHING ON YOUR SIDE

OR ON OUR SIDE WAS BETTER OR WORSE. TO FOLLOW DIFFERENT PATHS DOES NOT MEAN TO FOLLOW BETTER OR WORSE PATHS. IT IS SIMPLY THAT THE LANDSCAPES ARE DIFFERENT. THE U.S. SIDE HAS REPEATEDLY SPOKEN OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF COMPARING SOVIET AND U.S. STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THIS MUST CONSTANTLY BE KEPT IN MIND IN THE CONDUCT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION, TOO, HAS THIS IN ITS FIELD OF VISION. IT IS NECESSARY FOR US TO FIND AGREED MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE ENTIRE EXISTING STRATEGIC SITUATION, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985. THIS CONCLUDES MY IMPROVISATION AND NOW I TURN TO THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT LYING BEFORE ME ON THE TABLE.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION WILL CONTINUE SETTING FORTH THE APPROACH OF THE SOVIET SIDE TO THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF PRINCIPLE FOR THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985.

I

THE USSR DELEGATION HAS REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT IN WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE SIDES MUST INVARIABLY BE GUIDED BY RECOGNITION OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SIDES, BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY. PROCEEDING FROM THIS PREMISE, IN WORKING OUT THE AGREEMENT, LIMITATIONS MUST BE CONSIDERED ON ALL TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS CAPABLE OF STRIKING TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE, INCLUDING FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, WITH AN APPROPRIATE ACCOUNT FOR THE PARTICULARS OF THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF THE SIDES AND THE EXISTENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES.

THE POSITION OF PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION ON THESE QUESTIONS, BASED ON THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, IS SET FORTH IN THE OCTOBER 4, 1974 STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION. FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET POSITION AND PROPOSALS RELATED

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TO WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985, WE WOULD LIKE TO DRAW PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THIS STATEMENT. FINDING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE QUESTIONS SET FORTH IN THAT STATEMENT WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES AND WOULD FACILITATE ACCOMPLISHING THE TASK DEFINED BY THE SOVIET-AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING OF JULY 3, 1974.

II

THE SOVIET-AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING OF JULY 3, 1974 ENVISAGES ESTABLISHMENT OF QUANTITATIVE LIMITATIONS AS ONE OF THE IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THE 1972 INTERIM AGREEMENT, WHICH IS IN FORCE, SET A LIMIT TO THE QUANTITATIVE BUILD-UP OF SOME TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985 IS TO BE A FURTHER STEP IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS LIMITATION. IT MUST BE MORE COMPLETE AND BROADER IN TERMS OF THE SYSTEMS IT COVERS AND IN TERMS OF THE NATURE OF THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED ON THESE SYSTEMS.

PROCEEDING FROM THIS PREMISE AND GUIDED BY THE INTERESTS OF ACHIEVING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDING, AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT PAST DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE SIDES, THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSES THAT A MAXIMUM AGGREGATE QUANTITATIVE LEVEL BE ESTABLISHED FOR ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS AND STRATEGIC BOMBERS.

IN ITS STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 1 THE USSR DELEGATION SET FORTH IN DETAIL ITS VIEWS REGARDING THOSE SYSTEMS, LIMITATIONS ON WHICH MUST BE CONSIDERED IN WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT. AMONG THESE ARE ICBM LAUNCHERS AND SLBM LAUNCHERS, AS WELL AS MODERN BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES. THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSES IN THIS CONNECTION RETENTION, AS SUB-LEVELS, OF THE LIMITATIONS ON THE NUMBERS OF ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS AND MODERN BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES, WHICH ENSUE FROM THE INTERIM AGREEMENT OF MAY 26, 1972 AND THE PROTOCOL THERETO.

THE LIMITATIONS CONTAINED IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WERE THE RESULT OF A THOROUGH AND COMPREHENSIVE CONSIDERATION  
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OF THE FACTORS AND CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING TO THESE TYPES OF ARMAMENTS.

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE FACTORS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN WORKING OUT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WILL CONTINUE TO INFLUENCE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. CONSEQUENTLY, THESE LIMITATIONS RETAIN THEIR IMPORTANCE ALSO FOR THE TIME FRAME SET BY THE JULY 3, 1974 UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, I.E. FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985.

QUESTIONS OF LIMITING STRATEGIC BOMBERS MUST ALSO BE CONSIDERED. THIS TYPE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPON IS NOT COVERED BY THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IN FORCE. AT THE SAME TIME STRATEGIC BOMBERS, AS YOU KNOW, ARE A SUBSTANTIAL COMPONENT OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMAMENTS OF THE SIDES, AND THEY

MUST BE LIMITED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT IN VIEW OF THEIR IMPORT-  
ANCE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF EMBODYING IN THE AGREEMENT THE  
PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL  
ADVANTAGE. THE SOVIET DELEGATION NOTES THAT THE SIDES  
HOLD COMMON VIEWS REGARDING THE NECESSITY OF LIMITING STRA-  
TEGIC BOMBERS.

IN DETERMINING THE SPECIFIC VALUES OF THE MAXIMUM  
AGGREGATE QUANTITATIVE LEVELS FROM THE SIDES WITH RESPECT TO  
ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS AND STRATEGIC BOMBERS, IT  
IS NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR  
SYSTEMS, DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ABOARD CARRIERS, THE EXISTENCE  
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES, AND GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS.  
AN ACCOUNT FOR THESE SYSTEMS AND FACTORS CONSTITUTES PRACTICAL  
EMBODIMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSI-  
BILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE IN THE NEW AGREEMENT.

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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P 112215Z OCT 74

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2239

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0104

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

THE USSR DELEGATION HAS POINTED OUT, IN PARTICULAR  
AT THE MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 27, AND ALSO ON OCTOBER 1 AND 4,  
THAT POSSESSION BY ONE OF THE SIDES OF HUNDREDS OF NUCLEAR  
DELIVERY SYSTEMS LOCATED AT BASES ON FOREIGN TERRITORIES

IN ESSENCE MEANS THAT THIS SIDE HAS AN ADDITIONAL STRATEGIC POTENTIAL WHICH CANNOT BE IGNORED IN THE CONTEXT OF WORKING OUT THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985. FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DETERMINING THE SPECIFIC VALUES OF QUANTITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

IN THE COURSE OF THE CURRENT PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS, IN PARTICULAR AT THE MEETINGS ON OCTOBER 1 AND 4, THE USSR DELEGATION HAS POINTED OUT THAT NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ABOARD CARRIERS CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT COMPONENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. POSSESSION BY ONE OF THE SIDES OF HUNDREDS OF NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT, CAPABLE OF CARRYING THOUSANDS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IN ESSENCE EXPANDS THE ASSORTMENT OF THAT SIDE'S STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, AND  
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IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT IN WORKING OUT THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENTS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985. THE GREAT CAPABILITIES OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS TO MANEUVER AND THEIR PRACTICALLY UNLIMITED SAILING RANGE GIVE THE DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ABOARD THEM THE CHARACTERISTICS OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS--THE CAPABILITY TO CARRY OUT NUCLEAR STRIKES ON TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE. IN THIS CONNECTION, IN DETERMINING THE SPECIFIC VALUES OF QUANTITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ABOARD CARRIERS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A PART OF STRATEGIC AVIATION.

POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY THIRD COUNTRIES MUST ALSO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. AT THE MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 27 THE USSR DELEGATION POINTED OUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS FACTOR AND PROVIDED APPROPRIATE RATIONALE. IN PARTICULAR, WE NOTED THAT THE EXISTENCE AND POSSIBLE BUILD-UP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES DURING THE PERIOD OF EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT CANNOT BUT AFFECT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SIDES; MOREOVER, THE OPERATION OF THIS FACTOR MAY HAVE A DIFFERENT, AND AT TIMES EVEN DIRECTLY OPPOSITE, IMPORTANCE FOR THE SIDES. THIS FACTOR MUST APPROPRIATELY BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN WORKING OUT THE SPECIFIC VALUES OF QUANTITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT DURING THE PERIOD OF EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT THE SOVIET SIDE WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE BUILD-UP IN THE NUMBERS OF MODERN BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES IN THIRD COUNTRIES AND WILL RESERVE THE RIGHT TO A CORRESPONDING INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF ITS OWN SUBMARINES.

IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO CONSIDER THE PARTICULARS OF

THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF THE SIDES, WHICH INFLUENCE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. FOR EXAMPLE, IN CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF LIMITING BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES, IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT DIFFERENCES IN THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF THE USSR AND THE U.S., WHICH ARE MOREOVER MAGNIFIED BY ONE OF THE SIDES HAVING SUBMARINES BASES ON THE TERRITORY OF THIRD STATES.

THE STRATEGIC IMBALANCE IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF USSR AND  
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U.S. SUBMARINES CANNOT BUT AFFECT THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. WE KNOW OF CALCULATIONS PUBLISHED IN THE U.S., ACCORDING TO WHICH, CONSIDERING THE DIFFERENCES IN THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF THE SIDES, AS WELL AS THE FACT THAT THE U.S. SIDE HAS FORWARD SUBMARINE BASES, IN ORDER TO ENSURE AN EQUAL NUMBER OF SUBMARINES ON STATION IT IS ENOUGH FOR THE UNITED STATES TO HAVE TWO SUBMARINES FOR EVERY THREE SOVIET SUBMARINES. IT FOLLOWS FROM THIS THAT THE U.S. SIDE IS THEREBY ENABLED TO KEEP ON STATION A CORRESPONDINGLY LARGER NUMBER OF BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES AT ANY GIVEN TIME.

THUS, THE PARTICULARS OF THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF THE SIDES, WHICH INFLUENCE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DETERMINING THE SPECIFIC VALUES OF QUANTITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

### III

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT EVERYTHING SAID IN THIS STATEMENT AS WELL AS EARLIER, THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT PROVISIONS FOR SOME REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS CAN BE INCLUDED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

### IV

THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY THE SOVIET SIDE TODAY ARE BASED ON A COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT FOR THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN ALL ITS ENTIRETY AND IN ITS DYNAMICS. THUS, THEY ARE FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, WHICH IS AGREED BETWEEN THE SIDES.

WE EXPECT THAT THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET SIDE, WHICH WERE MOTIVATED BY A DESIRE TO FACILITATE ACHIEVEMENT OF CONCRETE UNDERSTANDING ON THE FURTHER LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WILL BE MET BY A CORRECT UNDERSTANDING AND APPROPRIATE RESPONSE ON THE PART OF THE U.S. SIDE.

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